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Abstract In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet
and its users in terms of situated cognition theory. We first argue that the In-
ternet is a new kind of cognitive ecology, providing almost constant access to
a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into
our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory
and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collec-
tive cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by taking an embedded
cognition view and analyze how the Internet aids certain cognitive tasks. Af-
ter that, we conceptualize how the Internet enables new kinds of embodied
interaction, extends certain aspects of our embodiment, and examine how
wearable technologies that monitor physiological, behavioral and contextual
states transform the embodied self. On the basis of the degree of cognitive
integration between a user and Internet resource, we then look at how and
when the Internet extends our cognitive processes. We end this chapter with
a discussion of distributed and collective cognition as facilitated by the In-
ternet.
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1 Introduction
The Internet has radically altered the way we access information, deeply
transforming the way we think, act and and remember. Very few of our cog-
nitive and epistemic endeavors, either individual or collective, are undertaken
without some sort of involvement of the Internet: we look up information with
search engines, store documents in the cloud, navigate with online maps, read
online newspapers and books, engage with online courses, use online recipes,
check online timetables, watch online videos, play online games, and so on. In
this chapter we conceptualize the Internet as part of our cognitive ecology (see
Bateson, 1972; Hutchins, 2010). Cognitive ecologies can be defined as “the
multidimensional contexts in which we remember, feel, think, sense, commu-
nicate, imagine, and act, often collaboratively, on the fly, and in rich ongoing
interaction with our environments” (Tribble and Sutton, 2011, p. 94). In our
contemporary digital society (see Lupton, 2015), the Internet constitutes an
important part of our cognitive ecology, as most people spend many hours
per day interacting with the Internet via TVs, desktop computers, laptops,
tablets, smartphones, smartwatches, and other devices.
We agree with Hutchins that “the study of cognitive ecosystems will be-
come an increasingly important part of cognitive science” (Hutchins, 2010,
p. 705). This chapter therefore aims to understand the cognitive and epis-
temic implications of the Internet. It aims to take seriously the Internet as
an important part of our cognitive ecology, contributing to human cognition
in a variety of ways. Our analysis takes the perspective of situated cognition
theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and col-
lective cognition (Robbins and Aydede, 2009). Situated cognition theory is
a set of approaches to human cognition underlining the importance of our
embodied interactions with the socio-technological environment (Hutchins,
1995; Clark, 1997, 2008; Dourish, 2001; Anderson, 2003; Gallagher, 2005;
Menary, 2010; Sutton, 2010; Malafouris, 2013). A situated approach allows
us to look at the relationship between the Internet and its users from a variety
of viewpoints. It is partly for this reason that we believe this approach is in
an especially strong position to help us understand the cognitive contribution
of the Internet, as we want to cast our explanatory net as widely as possible.
A number of recent works have, likewise, adopted a situated approach when
discussing the relation between human cognition and the Internet or World
Wide Web1. These include Clowes (2015), Halpin (2013), Halpin et al. (2010),
Smart (2012; 2014), and Staley (2014) (henceforth the ‘Web’). This chapter
1 The current chapter uses the term ‘Internet’ as a catch-all term for all the various
applications that are built on top of the Internet. This includes the World Wide Web,
which is currently the most popular Internet application. As such, when we refer to
the Internet as a cognitive ecology, we mean to suggest that the Web (as well as all
other Internet applications, such as email) should be included as part of the cognitive
ecology.
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builds on and synthesizes these works into an extensive overview and analysis
of the cognitive implications of the Internet.
The chapter has the following structure. We start by conceptualizing the
Internet as a new kind of cognitive ecology, looking specifically at the Social
Web, the Web of Data, mobile computing, human computation, augmented
reality, and personal informatics (see Section 2). After that, we outline situ-
ated cognition theory, briefly analyzing some of the relations between embed-
ded, embodied, extended, distributed, and collective cognition (see Section 3).
We then analyze the Internet in terms of these frameworks. Taking an embed-
ded cognition view, we conceptualize how the Internet shapes certain kinds
of cognitive tasks (see Section 3.1). We then look at how the Internet enables
new kinds of embodied interaction, extends certain aspects of our embodi-
ment, and (potentially) transforms the embodied self (see Section 3.2). There-
after, on the basis of the degree of cognitive integration between the user and
online information, we analyze the kinds of situations in which the Internet
might be said to form a constitutive part of human cognitive processes—
part of the physical machinery of the human mind (see Section 3.3). We end
this chapter with a discussion of distributed and collective cognition as facil-
itated by large-scale forms of technology-mediated social participation (see
Section 3.4).
2 The Internet: A New Kind of Cognitive Ecology
Over the past several decades, the Internet has emerged as an important part
of the material environment in which human (and perhaps machine2) intelli-
gence is realized. This view of the Internet ties in nicely with ecological ap-
proaches to cognition (see Bateson, 1972; Malafouris, 2013; Hutchins, 2010),
which emphasize the role of cognitive ecosystems (i.e., complex networks of
material forces and factors that span brain, body and world) in attempts
to explain and understand human cognitive capabilities. Hutchins (2010),
for example, suggests that our attempt to understand “cognitive phenomena
must include a consideration of the environments in which cognitive processes
develop and operate” (p. 706). From an ecological perspective, therefore, the
Internet can be seen as part of the ecosystem for human cognition: it serves
as an increasingly important part of the material environment in which an
ever-expanding array of human cognitive and epistemic activities unfold. An
ecological perspective also invites something of a methodological and concep-
tual shift when it comes to analyzing the cognitive effects of the Internet (see
Smart, 2013). In particular, by adopting an ecological perspective, it seems
appropriate to analyze the Internet from the perspective of approaches that
are typically subsumed under the heading of a situated approach to cognition,
2 Smart (2013), for example, suggests that the Web provides a new kind of ecological
context in which advanced forms of machine intelligence might emerge.
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e.g., embedded, embodied, extended and distributed/collective approaches to
cognition (see Robbins and Aydede, 2009). Such an approach seems partic-
ularly appropriate once we consider some of the current areas of research
and development that are shaping the technological trajectory of the Inter-
net and Web. Prominent areas of research attention in the Web and Internet
Science (WAIS) community thus include (but are not limited to) the follow-
ing3:
• The Social Web: Some of the most popular systems on the Web today
form part of what is known as the Social Web. These include social net-
working sites, such as Facebook; microblogging services, such as Twitter;
and social media systems, such as Wikipedia and YouTube. The Social
Web is currently a major focus of interest for those concerned with issues
of collective intelligence and distributed cognition (Hendler and Berners-
Lee, 2010; Malone et al, 2010; Chi, 2009; Chi et al, 2008; Halpin, 2013).
• The Web of Data: The Web is increasingly viewed as a platform that
supports the implementation of data-driven apps, services and data ana-
lytic capabilities. The use of linked data formats promises to increase the
accessibility of online content, as well as enhance the flexibility of digital
representations. Such capabilities are sometimes seen as relevant to the
emergence of Web-based forms of cognitive extension (Smart, in press,
2012)4. It is important not to underestimate the transformative impact of
the sort of ubiquitous data environment that might be brought into being
on the back of the Web of Data. In order to help us see this, consider the
way in which the constant stream of data provided by the Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) has changed the nature of human spatial navigation
capabilities, with potential repercussions for the neural mechanisms that
support spatial cognition (see Maguire et al, 2000)5.
• Mobile Computing & Wearable Devices: Mobile access to the Inter-
net is a key capability area for many technology vendors. A range of mobile
Internet-enabled devices are currently available, of which the smartphone
is undoubtedly the most popular. Mobility is a key factor in increasing
our access to online data and services. It is also central to the emergence
of what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Embodied Web’ (see Matsumoto
3 This represents a subset of all the areas that could have been listed. Other areas
of notable interest from a cognitive science perspective include cloud computing (see
Clowes, 2015), the Semantic Web (see Smart, in press), and the Internet of Things
(see Section 3.1).
4 In particular, the use of linked data formats helps to separate issues of information
presentation from issues of information representation. This kind of ‘presentational
agnosticism’ is crucial when it comes to the flexible (and dynamic) creation of cues,
prompts, and affordances that serve to shape the profile of human thought and action
(see Smart, in press).
5 It is also interesting to note the way in which this ubiquitous and ever-present ‘data
environment’ helps to provide new opportunities for the implementation of location-
aware intelligent systems, such as driverless cars and aerial drones.
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et al, 2008)—the idea that our interactions with the Web will eventually
occur as part of our everyday embodied engagements with a heterogeneous
array of material artifacts. The fact that mobile devices, such as smart-
phones and wearable devices, are becoming so closely associated with the
biological body, coupled with the fact that their modes of operation are in-
creasingly linked to our physical movements and physiological processes,
highlights the potential relevance of the Internet (and Internet-enabled
devices) to issues of material embodiment and embodied cognition (see
Section 3.2).
• Human Computation: Human computation is an evolving area of re-
search that seeks to harness human intelligence in the context of computa-
tional tasks, especially those whose complexity exceeds the capabilities of
existing Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms (Michelucci, 2013; Law and
von Ahn, 2011). Research in the area of human computation seeks to study
the ways in which human capabilities can be integrated into some larger
computational processing routine, yielding a form of bio-technologically
hybrid computational system. In this case, the Internet often serves as a
convenient platform for combining the complementary capabilities of con-
ventional computing systems and human agents. Citizen science is one area
where Web-based forms of human computation system are often used to
good effect (Lintott and Reed, 2013). Compelling examples of such systems
can now be found in a number of scientific areas, including proteomics
(Khatib et al, 2011), astronomy (Lintott et al, 2008), and neuroscience
(Marx, 2013; Helmstaedter et al, 2013). From the perspective of situated
cognition, such research is relevant to issues of distributed cognition and
the realization of bio-technologically hybrid forms of machine intelligence
(Michelucci, 2016; Smart, 2013).
• Augmented/Mixed Reality: Augmented/mixed reality devices aim to
‘embed’ digital information in the real world by adding virtual overlays
to the real-world environment. Some notable innovations in this area in-
clude Google Glass and Microsoft HoloLens. The cognitive impact of such
devices has typically been discussed in relation to both embodied (Smart,
2014) and extended cognition (Smart, 2012); however, we can also view
technological advances in this area as relevant to issues of embedded cog-
nition (see Section 3.1).
• Personal Informatics & Personalization: Issues of personalization
and the ‘quantified self’ (see Swan, 2013) are increasingly popular focus
areas for WAIS research. Although the majority of research in this area
is concerned with personal data stores (Van Kleek and O’Hara, 2014) and
self-tracking technologies (Lupton, 2013), there is also considerable interest
in the cognitive and epistemic impact of techniques that support person-
alized access to online information (e.g., Simpson, 2012). Issues of person-
alization and personal informatics are of interest from the perspective of
both extended (Clowes, 2015) and embodied cognition (see Section 3.2).
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As is apparent from this (admittedly partial) list, our near-term future
is one in which the Internet is likely to play an ever-more intimate role in
shaping the nature of our everyday cognitive activities. Relative to this influ-
ence, it makes sense, we suggest, to see the Internet as a important part of
the cognitively-potent extra-organismic environment in which our biological
brains are now situated. The Internet, in other words, should be seen as a
form of cognitive ecology. Not only does this perspective help to establish an
important link with ecological approaches in contemporary cognitive science
(Hutchins, 2010; Malafouris, 2013; Tribble and Sutton, 2011), it also helps
us to think about the creation and modification of online content as a form
of ‘ecological engineering’ (Sterelny, 2003) or ‘cognitive niche construction’
(Clark, 2008). Every time we upload, annotate, edit, tweet or post, we are all
(arguably) engaged in the construction and configuration of an environment
that (in return) plays an increasingly important role in shaping the profile of
our cognitive and intellectual endeavors6.
3 Situated Cognition Theory
In the last twenty to thirty years, there has been a shift in the cognitive
sciences away from focusing on cognitive processes realized in the brain and
towards focusing on cognitive processes involving brain, body, and environ-
ment (e.g., Clark, 1997). In The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition,
Robbins and Aydede (2009) identify three distinct but related theses that
characterize the situated cognition movement. First, the embodied cognition
thesis, which claims that cognition depends on, and is sometimes constituted
by, the human body (e.g., Gallagher, 2005). Second, the embedded cognition
thesis, which claims that our cognitive processes are sometimes shaped but
not constituted by bio-external resources (e.g., Rupert, 2004). Third, the ex-
tended and distributed cognition theses, which claim that cognitive states and
processes, under certain conditions, are distributed across embodied agents
and cognitive artifacts or other bio-external resources (e.g., Hutchins, 1995;
Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Some theorists take these three approaches as
a package deal, whereas others defend only one of these approaches. In this
chapter, we do not prioritize one approach over another but see merit in all of
6 Aside from its cognitive and epistemic effects, the Internet also influences the struc-
ture and organization of social processes. This raises a wealth of (socio-economic,
socio-cultural and socio-political) issues that are the current focus of attention within
the social sciences and digital humanities communities (Lupton, 2015; van Dijk, 2012).
An in-depth discussion of such issues is beyond the scope of the current chapter; how-
ever, it is important to bear in mind that the Internet may sometimes be seen to exert
an indirect influence on cognitive processes as a result of its ability to reshape the
wider social, political, cultural and economic landscapes in which much of human
thought and action takes place.
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these approaches as a means to better understand the cognitive implications
of the Internet.
Situated cognition theory can thus be seen as the genus and embodied, em-
bedded, and extended/distributed cognition theory as its species7. All these
approaches have conceptual and metaphysical consequences, since they move
beyond an individualist form of cognitivism and towards a picture that in-
volves brain, body, and environment. As a result, these approaches also have
methodological consequences: rather than merely focussing on cognitive pro-
cesses in the brain, they advocate that we should focus on the cognitive re-
lation between the brain, body, and environment, both on a conceptual and
empirical level. Therefore, in order to study situated cognitive systems, Clark
argues that we need “a new kind of cognitive scientific collaboration involv-
ing neuroscience, physiology, and cultural, social and technological studies in
about equal measure” (Clark, 2001, p. 154). One of the goals of this chapter is
to contribute to Clark’s call by conceptualizing human-Internet interactions
in light of the different species of situated cognition theory.
The relationship between these three species is not always clear, as there
are different versions of each species with claims of various strengths. In the
case of embodied cognition, for example, one can make a distinction between
weak and strong embodied cognition. Weak embodied cognition claims that
human cognitive processes sometimes depend on and are shaped by the body,
but are not co-constituted by it. Strong embodied cognition, on the other
hand, claims that cognition is partly constituted by the body. It seems that
the embedded and extended cognition theses have to incorporate (some ver-
sion of) the embodied cognition thesis. This is so because one needs to interact
bodily with environmental structures and cognitive artifacts in order to scaf-
fold or extend one’s cognitive processes. The body thus plays an essential role
in embedding or extending cognition. However, one can be an embedded cog-
nition theorist without accepting the strong version of the embodied cognition
thesis. So, one can claim that cognitive processes depend on bodily processes
and environmental structures, but deny that these are constitutive of cogni-
tion. Body and environment are then mere causal input to the brain-bound
cognitive system. This relationship is different for extended cognition, which
seems to include a strong version of embodied cognition as demonstrated by
Clark’s phrases “putting brain, body and world back together again” (Clark,
1997) and “where brain, body, and world collide” (Clark, 1999). Here, the
body is seen as one of the constitutive elements in a cognitive process that is
distributed across brain, body, and the extra-organismic environment. Paul
Dourish (2001), for example, is an embodied cognition theorist who is inter-
ested in how embodied creatures like ourselves interact with computational
7 Whilst this is a helpful tripartite distinction between species of situated cogni-
tion theory, it is not exhaustive. There are other views such as enactivism (Stewart
et al, 2010), collective cognition (Smart et al, 2010b) and transactive memory theory
(Wegner, 1995) that are also non-Cartesian in that they are concerned with the way
a cognitive agent is situated in the environment.
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systems like tangible computing systems. He refers to this as ‘embodied in-
teraction’. These kinds of computational systems, however, are not conceived
of by Dourish as part of the human cognitive system. Instead, they are seen
as resources that shape embodied cognitive processes. As such, Dourish is an
embodied cognition theorist who embraces an embedded, but not extended,
perspective.
Robbins and Aydede (2009) lump together the extended and distributed
cognition theses, as both of these views argue that external resources can be
constitutive of cognition. There are, however, important differences between
the two views. Hutchins (2014) points out that extended cognition refers to a
subset of cognitive events that involve the interaction of internal and external
resources. Distributed cognition, by contrast, is a view on all of cognition. So
the question is not whether or when cognition is distributed; rather “...the
interesting questions concern the elements of the cognitive system, the rela-
tions among the elements, and how cognitive processes arise from interactions
among those elements...The hypothesis of extended cognition is an impor-
tant hypothesis within the perspective of distributed cognition” (Hutchins,
2014, p. 36) [emphasis added]. Distributed cognition is thus a much broader
view than extended cognition. Furthermore, extended cognition is ‘organism-
centered’ in the sense that it sees the biological (human) agent as playing a
crucial role in the assembly, maintenance and monitoring of extended cogni-
tive circuits (see Clark, 2008, p. 139). Distributed cognition theory, in con-
trast, does not assume that humans are necessarily the center of distributed
systems. “Centers and boundaries are features determined by the relative
density of information flow across a system”, suggests Hutchins (2014, p. 37).
This marks an important difference between extended mind theorists and the
proponents of so-called distributed cognition. Extended mind theorists, such
as Clark (2008), emphasize the crucial role of the biological brain in the as-
sembly of extended cognitive systems. This, as Clark notes, leads to the idea
that cognition is organism-centered, even if it isn’t always organism-bound.
Distributed cognition theorists, such as Hutchins (2011), tend to object to
this organism-centered view. They worry that “by stressing the pivotal role
of the brain in the recruitment of external resources and in the maintenance
of resource-engaging cycles, [the extended mind theorist] actually gives too
much away to a traditional internalist vision” (Clark, 2011, p. 451).
Much of the research into distributed cognition has typically focused
on socio-technical systems that involve the interaction of (multiple) human
agents with non-biological props, aids and artifacts (Hutchins, 1995). Given
that many kinds of Internet-based systems are ones that feature a combina-
tion of social and technological elements, it seems that the Internet might be
a natural place to look for instances of distributed cognizing. As already men-
tioned, however, the use of the term ‘distributed cognition’ is apt to cause
confusion. It might seem, for example, that by using the term distributed
cognition we are referring to a particular form of cognition, one that is, in
this case, realized by multiple individuals acting in concert with an array of
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non-biological props, aids and artifacts. Recently, however, Hutchins (2014)
has suggested that this is the wrong way to view the notion of distributed
cognition. “Distributed cognition,” he suggests, “is not a kind of cognition; it
is a perspective on all of cognition” (p. 3). The term ‘distributed cognition’
is thus equally applicable to cases of brain-based cognizing and to forms of
cognition that occur in the context of larger hybrid ensembles consisting of
both biological and non-biological elements. In view of this, we suggest that
the term ‘collective cognition’ is a more appropriate way to characterize the
cognitive processing that occurs in socially-distributed contexts, irrespective
of whether or not the relevant information processing loops involve technolog-
ical or artifactual mediation. Such a move may seem undesirable, especially
if one regards the term ‘collective cognition’ as referring solely to systems in
which multiple individuals participate in face-to-face exchanges. Giere (2007;
2012), for instance, attempts to make a distinction between what he calls
“full-blown distributed cognition” and “mere collective cognition” (Giere,
2007, p. 1). In particular, he suggests that systems in which instruments and
other artifacts form parts of a cognitive system should not be seen as in-
stances of collective cognition. Instead, he suggests that we should limit the
term ‘collective cognition’ to situations in which multiple human agents are
working together. It will be clear, however, that the way in which Giere (2007;
2012) interprets the term ‘distributed cognition’ is in some conflict with the
view adopted by Hutchins (2014). In addition, we should perhaps question
the extent to which it is actually possible to distinguish between cases of
distributed and collective cognition in the manner suggested by Giere. One
potential problem, here, is that even in face-to-face contexts it does not seem
entirely appropriate to grant that no form of artifactual mediation is taking
place. Human social exchanges are typically mediated by linguistic symbols
of either the verbal or orthographic variety, and these sorts of symbolic rep-
resentations are sometimes referred to as artifacts. Clark (1997, chap. 10),
for example, suggests that we should see public language as the ‘ultimate
artifact’, as a kind of tool that “enables us to reshape a variety of difficult
but important tasks into formats better suited to the basic computational
capacities of the human brain” (p. 193). In view of all this, we will use the
term ‘collective cognition’ to refer to systems of multiple agents that partic-
ipate in cognitive tasks (i.e., tasks that are typically glossed as cognitive in
nature), irrespective of whether or not these systems involve technological or
artifactual mediation.
Having thus briefly analyzed some of the relations between the species of
situated cognition theory, we now point out two important topics in situated
cognition theory, namely (1) the size of the unit of analysis and (2) whether
an external resource is constitutive of a cognitive state, process or system.
Some theorists focus on small scale systems comprising a single embodied
agent interacting with a cognitive artifact (Clark, 2008; Kirsh and Maglio,
1994), or two people interacting with each other, thereby forming a trans-
active memory system (Sutton et al, 2010; Wegner, 1995). Others focus on
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larger systems consisting of many embodied agents interacting with a num-
ber of artifacts such as a team of navigators on a ship (Hutchins, 1995), a
group of scientists working in a laboratory (Nersessian, 2009), or larger so-
cial groups such as sport teams (Williamson and Sutton, 2014; Theiner et al,
2010). In this chapter, our units of analyses are both single embodied agents
interacting with the Internet as well as collections of such agents. We also
look at systems where online information is merely scaffolding cognition and
where it is potentially integrated deeply into the cognitive processes of their
users, thereby extending their cognitive processes.
3.1 Embedded Cognition
Unlike the notion of extended cognition, which sees elements of the extra-
organismic environment as sometimes playing a constitutive role in the real-
ization of cognitive states and processes, the notion of embedded cognition
rejects the idea that the boundaries of cognition extend beyond the tradi-
tional biological borders of the human agent. Embedded cognition theorists
thus focus on how artifacts and other external resources aid, but do not con-
stitute, our cognitive systems (e.g., Rupert, 2004). In this subsection, we look
at how the Internet aids and shapes our cognition.
Throughout the evolution of our cognitive system, our minds have de-
pended heavily on material culture (Gregory, 1993; Vygotsky and Luria,
1994; Donald, 1993). Lambros Malafouris (2004; 2013) argues that tools and
other human-made objects are the conditions of possibility for a range of
cognitive operations which we often too carelessly attribute to our biological
heritage. The invention of written language, calculation devices, maps, the
printing press, and other cognitive technologies have augmented and shaped
our cognitive capacities. The Internet, on this view, is just the latest in a
long history of cognition shaping and enabling tools, opening some cognitive
spaces and perhaps closing some others.
Due to the Internet, we are currently living through important changes
in the material (and digital) culture of memory, as an increasingly varied
range of digital devices provide E-Memory adjuncts to, and extensions of,
our biological resources. E-Memory can be defined as digital systems, devices
and services that “we use to record, store and access digital memory traces
to augment, re-use or replace organismic systems of memory” (Clowes, 2013,
p. 107). Research in cognitive psychology appears to show that human cog-
nition is already factoring in the presence of E-Memory resources. In cases
where a computer file is believed to remain available in the future, there is a
tendency for our biological memory systems to remember the location rather
than the contents of the file (see Sparrow et al, 2011). If this is a general
indication of how our brains deal with ambient information stores, it is likely
they are already being restructured by constantly accessible online systems.
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It is still undetermined how much our biological memories are affected by
the cognitive affordances of the Internet and much more empirical data is
needed. However, it is clear that we are becoming ever-more accustomed to
using search technologies to recall facts and settle arguments. As we lean ever-
more heavily on these technologies our basic habits of mind and thinking are
undergoing significant changes.
When some theorists (e.g., Carr, 2010) bemoan that human cognition is
under threat from a host of new Internet technologies, they tend to forget
that it is not a pristine human mind which is under threat from technology,
but rather an artifact-dependent mind faced with the adaption and accommo-
dation to a new set of technologies (Donald, 1993). In Clark’s words, we have
always been “natural-born cyborgs” (Clark, 2003). However, it is clear that
E-Memory has a range of properties which make it very different from pre-
vious epochs of memory technology. For this reason, E-Memory potentially
has different effects on our cognitive systems.
Using previous external memory systems such as tying knots in a string,
making marks in clay, or maintaining written records tended to be effortful
tasks and ones where storage capacity was finite (Mayer-Scho¨nberger, 2011;
Donald, 1993). E-Memory, in contrast, can record vastly more than previous
regimes of technology. In principle, we can now store and retrieve a lifetime’s
worth of high resolution video and sound (Gemmell and Bell, 2009; Gemmell
et al, 2006). Gordon Bell calls this phenomenon “total recall”. Additionally,
recording, and to an extent accessing, E-Memory traces has become a rel-
atively effortless task for an individual equipped with a smartphone. This
suggests that Internet-mediated E-Memory will have a very different infor-
mational profile to past memory technologies. As we come to efficiently and
unthinkingly rely upon the Internet, the human cognitive profile is likely to
undergo significant changes. Much will depend on how our flexible cognitive
architecture accommodates to the new environment. The uses of E-Memory
we have so far discussed are largely mediated by personal mobile devices we
carry with us. The growing trend, however, is for the wider material envi-
ronment to become augmented with Internet-mediated technologies. We are
deliberately re-designing the material world to be “smarter”.
Given that embedded cognition recognizes the role of extra-organismic
factors in shaping human cognitive processes, it should come as no surprise
that there are many of points of interest for the embedded cognition theorist
attempting to understand the cognitive implications of the Internet. In fact,
practically all the features of the Internet ecology that surface in relation to
embodied, extended and collective cognition also come into focus when we
view the Internet through the lens of embedded cognition. There are, however,
a number of specific points of interest for the embedded cognition theorist.
These relate to the way in which the Internet of Things (IoT) and augmented
reality technologies are able to alter the features of the physical (and virtual)
environments in which we human agents are materially embedded.
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The aim of the IoT initiative is to equip a variety of everyday physical
objects with data acquisition, data processing and data exchange capabili-
ties (Greengard, 2015; Miller, 2015). In addition, the IoT tends to view the
environment as something of a cooperative partner with respect to the per-
formance of a multitude of different tasks. Crucially, the IoT promises to
deliver the kinds of capabilities that are often alluded to in discussions of
ubiquitous computing (Weiser, 1991) and ambient intelligence (Weber et al,
2005). The general idea is that by extending the reach of the Internet to the
elements of our physical environment, we are able to transform the environ-
ment into something that is highly responsive to our needs and supportive
of our thoughts and actions. This is the guiding principle behind current
work that seeks to develop a seemingly endless array of ‘smart things’. These
include, for example, smart TVs, smart cars, smart buildings, smart cities,
and, of course, smart environments (see Miller, 2015). From the perspective
of embedded cognition, the IoT promises to alter the nature of our interactive
engagements with the external environment, thereby influencing the kinds of
dependencies that are deemed to shape brain-based forms of cognitive pro-
cessing. In particular, we can see the advent of the IoT as part of an attempt
to structure the environment in ways that enhance our biologically-based
capabilities.
As a concrete example of the way in which the IoT may help to shape hu-
man cognition, consider the case of prospective memory. Prospective memory
is a form of memory that involves “remembering to carry out intended actions
without being instructed to do so” (Baddeley et al, 2009, p. 343). The case
of an individual who needs to remember to defrost the meat by removing it
from the freezer when they return home from work serves as a typical exam-
ple of prospective memory. Such forms of memory are, of course, relatively
commonplace, and they are pretty much indispensable in terms of our ability
to coordinate our lives effectively—a fact that is all too sadly evidenced by
those suffering from impairments in prospective memory (see Woods et al,
2008). As has been pointed out by a number of commentators (e.g., Staley,
2014, pp. 36-37), the advent of smart environments provides a range of op-
portunities to reshape the nature of prospective memory. Staley (2014), for
example, talks of smart devices being used to implement prospective memory
systems that allow individuals to ‘embed their intent’ within specific envi-
ronments, such as within their home or office. An individual could thus be
reminded of the need to engage in particular actions (e.g., to remove the meat
from the freezer) whenever they are suitably placed to perform these actions
(e.g., when they first enter the kitchen upon returning home from work)8.
Prospective memory is also embedded in the mobile devices that we carry
around with us. We can expect these devices to exhibit ever-greater levels
8 Note that inasmuch as we see prospective memory as a form of memory in which
we perform future actions without explicit instructions (see Baddeley et al, 2009), it
is unclear to what extent we should regard reminder systems as implementing a form
of (external) prospective memory.
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of contextual sensitivity, e.g., reminding us to check our shopping list as we
pass a grocery store. Relying on such devices to structure our activities can
be seen as partially outsourcing human agency to our devices. However, this
need not be seen as undermining our agentive powers. Instead, it can be seen
as continuing a long history of using devices to structure, support and (even)
generate complex aspects of human agency (see Neumann and Cowley, 2013,
for further discussion).
Aside from the IoT, another focus of interest for the embedded cognition
theorist relates to the development of augmented and mixed reality devices.
These devices (the exemplar of which is Google’s Project Glass) support the
creation of virtual overlays that are superimposed on the real-world environ-
ment. A crucial point of interest, here, concerns the way in which such devices
can be seen to modify the properties of the environment in which cognition
occurs. By generating an array of virtual representations, augmented reality
devices are able to alter the ‘effective’ structure of the local environment, ex-
panding the array of informational cues and affordances that can be used to
guide cognitive processing. The inherent flexibility of these ‘virtual designer
environments’9 means that future generations will have an unprecedented op-
portunity to rapidly reconfigure the structure of their environments in ways
that complement, supplement or perhaps even supplant their brain-based
cognitive capabilities.
3.2 Embodied Cognition
Although there are a number of different views as to what is implied by
the term ‘embodied cognition’, a common feature of embodied cognition re-
search is the emphasis that is placed on extra-neural bodily factors in shap-
ing the course of cognitive processing (Anderson, 2003; Shapiro, 2007, 2011).
Typically, research into embodied cognition emphasizes the way in which an
organism’s bodily structure or physical actions help to constrain (and some-
times constitute) cognition. A somewhat trivial example is provided by the
way in which the placement of an organism’s sensory apparatus (the position
of their eyes and hears) helps to structure the incoming sensory array in ways
that support perceptual processing (Webb, 1996). Other research focuses on
the ways in which dynamically evolving motor state variables can help to
guide the expression of intelligent behavioral responses (e.g., McBeath et al,
1995). More complex forms of embodied cognition research come in the form
of work that seeks to evaluate the role of physical actions (e.g., hand gestures)
9 This notion of a ‘virtual designer environment’ builds on the notion of a ‘designer en-
vironment’ as discussed by Clark (1997): “We build ‘designer environments’ in which
human reason is able to far outstrip the computational ambit of the unaugmented
biological brain” (Clark, 1997, p. 191).
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in supporting various forms of human cognitive competence (Goldin-Meadow,
2003).
At first sight, it might appear that a discussion of embodied cognition is
somewhat out of place in a chapter that focuses on the role of the Inter-
net in shaping our cognitive profile. After all, work in embodied cognition
tends to focus on situations in which we are actively engaged with the real
world, exploiting all manner of sensorimotor cues in order to realize intel-
ligent thought and action. The nature of our interaction with the Internet
seems far removed from this sort of situation. Although we might be justified
in seeing the Internet as an important part of the context in which cogni-
tion occurs—part of the material backdrop against which our thoughts and
actions take shape—it is by no means clear that the details of our physical
embodiment really matter that much when it comes to understanding the
cognitive consequences of our online interactions.
There are, in fact, a number of ways in which the Internet impacts on
issues that lie at the heart of the embodied cognition research programme.
Firstly, as noted by Smart (2014), the advent of mobile and portable comput-
ing solutions is progressively altering our sense of what it means to engage
with the online world. In place of conventional forms of interaction, in which
we interact with the Internet via a browser interface while seated at a desk-
top computer, it is increasingly common for us to engage with the Internet
as part of our embodied interactions with the wider physical environment.
Mobile devices, such as smartphones, for example, enable us to interleave our
interactions with the Internet and the real world in a way that seems to blur
the traditional distinction between ‘oﬄine’ and ‘online’ modes of interaction
(see Floridi, 2011, 2014). In addition, as new kinds of Internet-enabled device
become available, so the palette of physical actions and gestures that we use
to interact with the Internet is expanding. Touchscreens have clearly played
an important role, here, with swiping and zooming emerging as more-or-less
standard parts of our gestural lexicon. Other kinds of interactivity aim to
capitalize on the way in which we typically interact with a common array of
physical artifacts and objects, helping to support forms of ‘embodied interac-
tion’ (see Dourish, 2001) with the online world. Consider, for example, work
by Matsumoto et al. (2008) to develop a Web-enabled umbrella. The um-
brella features a variety of sensors (e.g., GPS, compass, accelerometer, etc.),
and it is able to project Web-based content directly into the user’s field of
view by virtue of a projection device focused on the underside of the umbrella
canopy. By providing the user with a range of interaction opportunities (e.g.,
the normal turning, dipping, and twisting actions that people perform with
umbrellas) and by also integrating information from a variety of sensors and
Web services, the umbrella is able to present a variety of forms of context-
relevant information that take into account both the user’s physical location,
as well as their current interests and activities. Of particular interest in the
current context, Matsumoto et al. (2008) describe their work as part of an
effort to realize what they call the ‘Embodied Web’: a form of enhanced inter-
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activity in which natural embodied interactions are used to interact with the
Web and “make our experience in the real world more engaging and active”
(Matsumoto et al, 2008, p. 49).
A second way in which notions of embodied cognition are relevant to un-
derstanding the cognitive significance of the Internet comes in the form of
what might be referred to as ‘the extended body’. The idea, here, is that
(in certain cases) it may make perfect sense to see Internet-enabled devices
as literal prosthetic extensions of an individual’s biological body. If this idea
seems to strange or unpalatable to you, perhaps it will help to reflect on what
it is that makes something a genuine body part. One possible answer to this
question focuses on the way in which our bodies work to mediate our senso-
rimotor engagements with the world. Our ears therefore count as part of our
body because they assist with the transduction of certain kinds of energetic
fluctuation in the ambient environment; our legs count as part of our body
because of the way in which they service our locomotory objectives; and our
teeth count as part of our body because of the way in which they enable us
to physically prepare certain kinds of matter for the processes of digestion
and absorption. Note that an appeal to the biological nature of the candidate
bodily elements will not suffice here. Should a cochlear implant, a prosthetic
limb or a tooth implant fail to count as part of our body simply because
they are not biological in nature? And what about the ‘bodies’ of smart cars
and mobile robots10 Do these systems fail to have a body simply because
they are not biological systems? The answer to these questions is surely a
resounding ‘no’. And once we drop appeals to biology in determining what it
is that makes something a part of the body then the path is clear for a more
functionally-oriented conception of the body. Crucially, once we have this
functional view to hand, it becomes possible to consider non-biological re-
sources as literal extensions of the biological body: providing a non-biological
element plays the same sort of functional role as a conventional (biologi-
cal) body part, then it seems we should treat that non-biological element as
a genuine part of the body. This, of course, opens the door to cognitively-
potent forms of ‘corporeal incorporation’ involving a variety of non-biological
resources.
One example of a functionally-oriented conception of the body is pro-
vided by Clark (2008; 2007). He suggests that we should identify the body
with whatever it is that just so happens to serve as the “locus of willed
action, the point of sensorimotor confluence, and the stable (though not per-
manently fixed) platform whose features and relations can be relied upon
(without being represented) in the computations underlying some intelligent
10 Importantly, issues of embodiment often surface in the context of research into
cognitive robotics (see Pfeifer and Bongard, 2007). This highlights the importance of
a non-biological conception of the body to embodied cognitive science: in the absence
of such a conception it becomes difficult to adopt a unified perspective of research
into a rich variety of materially-diverse (e.g., biological, robotic and virtual) embodied
cognitive systems (see Smart and Sycara, 2015).
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performances” (Clark, 2008, p. 207). The claim, in essence, is that we should
identify the body with whatever it is that is playing the sort of role that
our biological body typically plays with respect to the genesis and organiza-
tion of intelligent behavior. Inasmuch as we accept this claim, then it seems
that forms of bodily extension that involve our current arsenal of portable
and mobile Internet-enabled devices are a realistic possibility. In other words,
there seems to be no principled reason why Internet-enabled devices should
not be counted as, on occasion, functioning as literal body parts. The only
question, of course, is to what extent such devices actually are apt for bodily
incorporation. This is an issue that must appeal to the nature of our inter-
action with Internet-enabled devices, specifically the extent to which such
forms of interaction satisfy the sort of functional criteria alluded to by (e.g.)
Clark (2008). If we accept that Internet-enabled devices do actually function
as literal body parts—as prosthetic technological extensions that enable us
to sense, manipulate, exploit, and alter the online world—then there seems
to be no clear reason why such devices should not be of relevance and interest
to embodied cognitive science11. This is because embodied cognition is con-
cerned with the way in which bodily forces and factors influence cognition.
When technological resources become bodily protheses that may also (qua
embodied cognition) function as cognitive prostheses. This is particularly so
when such prostheses are recruited as part of our cognitive and epistemic
endeavours.
A variety of sources of (largely circumstantial and anecdotal) evidence
support the idea that issues of bodily extension may be relevant to a range
of Internet-enabled devices, most notably those that we carry around with
us (e.g., smartphones), or those that we attach to the biological body (e.g.,
smartwatches). Recent trends in technology development are thus largely con-
sistent with what Biocca (1999) refers to as ‘progressive embodiment’, the
idea that technological advances entail the “steadily advancing immersion
of sensorimotor channels to computer interfaces through a tighter and more
pervasive coupling of the body to interface sensors and displays” (Biocca,
1999, p. 5). Irrespective of whether we accept that the boundaries of the hu-
man mind are moving outwards (see Clark and Chalmers, 1998), it appears
that our technologies are progressively reaching inwards, attempting to es-
tablish ever-more intimate associations with the elements of the biological
body (see Lynch, 2014). Our emerging panoply of portable devices are thus
not just forms of smart machinery, they are also (potentially at least) forms
of ‘intimate machinery’.
11 The thing that is important to remember, here, is that inasmuch as a non-biological
resource counts as part of an organism’s body, then (relative to the claims made by
proponents of embodied cognition) the resource is (potentially) poised to play a role
in shaping that organism’s cognitive processing routines. As a result, if an Internet-
enabled device counts as a part of the body (on the basis of functional criteria), then
it seems that it should be just as much a focus of analytic attention for the proponent
of embodied cognition as should a more conventional (i.e., biological) body part.
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The mobile phone has, of course, been a popular focus of attention when
it comes to issues of bodily extension. Drain and Strong (2015), for example,
suggest that the smartphone “becomes incorporated within the assemblage of
bodily appendages, environmental features, and artifacts that we encounter in
everyday life, to the point where the phone can be considered as a prosthetic
extension of ourselves” (p. 190). A number of studies have also revealed that
users often regard their mobile phones as extensions of their ‘self’ or body
(Oksman and Rautianen, 2003b,a; Gant and Kiesler, 2001). Perhaps such
results should not come as a surprise given the way in which many individuals
now relate to their mobile phones. To an ever-greater extent, the smartphone
is an indispensable instrument that enables the individual to negotiate the
various social, cognitive and epistemic challenges that they confront as part of
their daily life (Drain and Strong, 2015; Miller, 2014). This is often reflected
in the kinds of deep emotional attachment that people have with their mobile
devices (Miller, 2014). As Vincent et al. (2005) note “for some people [their
mobile device] has become almost an extension of their body as they hold
and fondle the device even when the device is not in use” (p. 72).
One further line of research that may be relevant to claims regarding
the bodily incorporation of Internet-enabled devices comes from a study by
Salerno et al. (2012). Salerno et al. (2012) sought to investigate the neural
processing of self- and other-related stimuli using a trans-cranial magnetic
stimulation technique. As part of their experimental protocol, human sub-
jects were presented with four kinds of images. These showed 1) the subject’s
own hand, 2) the hand of another human subject, 3) the subject’s own mo-
bile phone, or 4) the mobile phone of another person. Interestingly, Salerno
et al. (2012) observed similar neurological responses when subjects were pre-
sented with images of both their own hands and their own mobile phones
(i.e., self-related stimuli). However, these responses were distinct from those
elicited by the images of ‘other-related’ stimuli (i.e., the hands or phones
of other people). Although the psychological significance of these results is
unclear at the present time, Salerno et al. (2012) note that issues of bodily
extension may be relevant to their findings. Interestingly, the effects observed
by Salerno et al. (2012) were specific to the right hemisphere of the brain.
This is consistent with neuropsychological research indicating that the right
brain hemisphere is important to a sense of body ownership, with damage to
the right hemisphere resulting in a form of ‘disownership’ of particular body
parts (Aglioti et al, 1996; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). Aglioti et al. (1996),
for example, report the case of a woman with damage to the right hemi-
sphere who denied ownership of her left hand and associated ‘extracorporeal’
objects, for example, the rings that were typically worn on her left hand.
Summarizing their results, Aglioti et al. (1996) suggest that “the mental im-
age of one’s body may include inanimate objects which [have] been in contact
or in close proximity with the body itself” (p. 293). They go onto claim that
their findings can be interpreted as providing support for the notion of an
‘extended body schema’, in which extra-corporeal objects become incorpo-
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rated into the neural processes that mediate a sense of one’s body and its
capacities for action.
In addition to issues of embodied interaction and bodily extension there is
a third way in which notions of embodied cognition may prove useful in en-
abling us to track the cognitive impact of Internet-related technologies. The
main point of interest, here, relates to the way in which new technologies are
reshaping the kind of opportunities that we have to track our bodily states
and actions. Wearable technologies thus provide not just a means to trans-
form the kind of contact we have with the online world, they also transform
the kind of relationship we have with ourselves (see Lupton, 2015). Crucially,
as wearable technologies become more sophisticated, they often become more
capable of sensing physiological and behavioral states that enable them to
contextualize their modes of operation in novel ways. Many contemporary
devices already feature this kind of context sensitivity. For example, when
I am located in New York, and I wish to visit a particular museum, I can
rely on the GPS capabilities of my Internet-enabled device—an iPhone let’s
say—to adapt its information retrieval processes in a manner that is ger-
mane to my current interests. The device, we can assume, is sensitive to my
geographic location in a way that enables it to return information that is
likely to be directly relevant to my immediate needs and concerns. A similar
form of context sensitivity is likely to become possible with future wearable
technologies. In this case, however, the devices are likely to factor in a far
richer range of cues and affordances than is possible with today’s technology.
Importantly, by being able to monitor body-related information it becomes
possible for this new suite of devices to sensitize their operation to factors
that are more directly relevant to our cognitive and epistemic activities. Con-
sider, for example, work by Koriat and Nussinson (2009) to investigate the
physiological correlates of the feeling of knowing. They report that the ten-
sion of the corrugator muscle can be used to detect the subjective experience
we have when we feel we know something. Inasmuch as future devices are
able to track physiological signals that index a variety of epistemic feelings
(such as the feeling of knowing or the feeling of difficulty) (see Michaelian
and Arango-Mun˜oz, 2014), it is possible that future technologies may be able
to adaptively modify their modes of operation to support human end-users
with regard to a variety of epistemically-related activities12.
The use of technology to record or track personal information is a central
element of work that goes under the heading of the ‘quantified self’ (Lup-
ton, 2013; Swan, 2013). This is a term that is used to refer to any form of
self-tracking activity, where the information that is typically tracked is of a
biological, behavioral or environmental nature. Current forms of self-tracking
12 A similar point is made by Kunze et al. (2013). They suggest that the use of
mobile sensing technologies portends an era in which technology is able to recognize
and monitor various forms of cognitive activity, revolutionizing our understanding of
the factors that contribute to optimal cognitive performance, as well as providing new
ways for technology to shape and scaffold our cognitive routines.
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include the recording of body weight, energy levels, time usage, sleep quality,
health, cognitive performance, athletic performance, and learning strategies
(Swan, 2013). Clearly, not all these forms of self-tracking are ones that need to
rely exclusively on Internet-enabled devices; nevertheless, an increasing num-
ber of devices are becoming available that attempt to automate or facilitate
self-tracking efforts. As Swan (2013) notes:
“An increasing number of new personal data streams are being generated
through quantified self tracking devices, biosensors, wireless Internet of Things
devices, health social network data, and social media data. Additional personal-
ized data streams from consumer EEGs, eye-tracking and emotion measurement
could be coming in the future” (p. 91).
The significance of Internet connectivity, here, is that it enables personal
information to be stored online and subjected to forms of online (e.g., cloud-
based) manipulation and processing. Such forms of online processing are often
essential when it comes to the analysis of personal data, especially when one
considers the quantity of data that can be generated by (e.g.) heart rate
sensors. It should also be relatively clear that by placing information online,
personal data is often made more amenable to large-scale forms of statistical
analysis that can provide potential insights into (e.g.) health-related phenom-
ena. The public availability of self-tracking data is thus a potential boon to
epidemiological and clinical research, supporting analyses into factors related
to disease onset and progression13.
One of the implications of the quantified self is that it provides a greater
degree of awareness regarding one’s bodily states and processes. Self-tracking
technologies are thus sometimes seen as a means of creating a digital dash-
board for the biological body, enabling individuals to tap into a wealth of
previously inaccessible data. Some writers thus talk about self-tracking de-
vices as supporting the emergence of technological ‘exosenses’ that extend
the reach of the body’s sensory capabilities:
“...the quantified self may become additionally transformed into the extended
exoself [i.e., a suite of exosenses] as data quantification and self-tracking enable
the development of new sense capabilities that are not possible with ordinary
senses. The individual body becomes a more knowable, calculable, and admin-
istrable object through QS [quantified self] activity, and individuals have an
increasingly intimate relationship with data as it mediates the experience of
reality” (Swan, 2013, p. 85).
The general idea, therefore, is that self-tracking affords a new way in which
body-related information can come to influence the course of cognitive pro-
cessing. In particular, by virtue of their ability to make body-related infor-
mation explicitly accessible and perceptible through the other senses14, the
13 For example, personal data could be used to evaluate hypotheses concerning the
links between sleep patterns and the etiologic bases of diabetes (Tasali et al, 2008),
depression (Landsness et al, 2011) and dementia (Sharma et al, 2015).
14 This is sometimes referred to as para-synthetic expression (Won et al, 2015).
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vision of the quantified self opens the door to forms of embodied cognition in
which issues of technological mediation are of critical importance. It has long
been known, for example, that individual cognitive and emotional responses
can be shaped by the explicit perception of physiological signals (e.g., Valins,
1966). In view of this, it seems entirely possible that future technologies could
play an important role in determining the role of bodily states and signals
in influencing our everyday thoughts and actions at both an individual and
social level (see Janssen et al, 2010)15. This is, of course, an issue that lies at
the heart of contemporary work in embodied cognitive science.
3.3 Extended Cognition
Having looked at how the Internet aids some of our cognitive processes and
how it relates to human embodiment, we now continue by conceptualizing
how it may extend our cognitive states and processes. Extended mind theory
takes a systems perspective on the relation between a cognitive agent and the
social and material environment in which that agent is situated. In essence,
the extended mind is a claim about the location of the material substrate
on which cognitive states and processes supervene. It is thus a metaphysical
claim with epistemological and methodological consequences.
John Sutton (2010) distinguished between two waves of extended mind
theorizing. The first wave argues for the parity of internal and external re-
sources (Clark and Chalmers, 1998), whereas the second wave argues for
the complementarity of internal and external resources (Heersmink, in press,
2015; Sutton, 2010). Sutton argues that external resources are often not on
a par with internal resources. In the case of memory, for example, internal
memory systems are dynamic, integrative and subject to degradation of their
traces, whereas external information is often static, not integrated with other
information and not subject to degradation. The complementarity view, as
formulated by Sutton, reads as follows:
“In extended cognitive systems, external states and processes need not mimic
or replicate the formats, dynamics or functions of inner states and processes.
Rather, different components of the overall (enduring or temporary) system
can play quite different roles and have different properties while coupling in
collective and complementary contributions to flexible thinking and acting”
(Sutton, 2010, p. 194).
Relative to this view, we can see that external resources need not replicate
internal resources; instead, they can have different properties, functions and
formats to those of the biologically-based cognitive system. It makes much
15 Explicit access to physiological information (e.g., heart rate) can also, on occasion,
influence our sense of body ownership concerning a non-biological appendage (see
Suzuki et al, 2013).
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more sense to rely upon and recruit external resources when they do some-
thing different from our native or biological capacities. Jointly, an embodied
brain plus a complementary resource is a much more versatile and power-
ful cognitive system than just an embodied brain without any external aids.
Wilson and Clark (2009) also defend a complementarity view. They write:
“Contrary to any requirement of fine-grained similarity then, what the friends
of extended cognition actually expect, and study, are hybrid processes in which
the inner and the outer contributions are typically highly distinct in nature,
yet deeply integrated and complementary” (Wilson and Clark, 2009, p. 72).
The cognitive integration of an embodied agent and a resource with com-
plementary properties and functions is thus important for better understand-
ing extended cognitive systems. However, most of the current discussion on
extended cognition and the Internet focuses on whether the Internet satis-
fies Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) conditions of reliability, trust, accessibility
and past endorsement (Clark, 2008; Smart, 2012, in press; Ludwig, 2015).
These conditions are often referred to as the “trust and glue” criteria, and
they are typically seen as part of the first wave of extended mind theoriz-
ing. The Internet is often seen as failing to meet these criteria16. Clark and
Chalmers (1998), for example, suggest that “The Internet is likely to fail on
multiple counts, unless I am unusually computer-reliant, facile with the tech-
nology, and trusting, but information in certain files on my computer may
qualify” (p. 18). In a later, co-authored publication, however, Clark says:
“Perhaps external representations on the Web, when integrated appropri-
ately into the processes that govern an agent’s behaviour, may count as part
of that agent’s cognitive architecture” (Halpin et al, 2010, p. 2).
So, to better understand human-Internet interactions in terms of extended
cognition theory, we need to focus on what “integrated appropriately into the
processes that govern an agent’s behaviour” means. We suggest that cogni-
tive integration between an agent and the Internet is a multidimensional phe-
nomenon. Some of the relevant dimensions include the kind and intensity of
information flow between an agent and the Internet, the accessibility of infor-
mation, the durability of agent-Internet couplings, the amount of trust a user
16 Problems with trust often lie at the root of these concerns. Clark (2010), for ex-
ample, claims people do not trust online content to the same extent that they trust
information retrieved from bio-memory. From an empirical perspective, however, it is
far from clear that people really do subject online information to the sort of evaluative
scrutiny that would undermine its candidacy for cognitive incorporation (see Smart,
in press). In addition, there a variety of reasons to suspect that at least some sources
of online content can be implicitly trusted. Individuals may, for example, rely on the
use of cloud-based personal data stores (see Van Kleek and O’Hara, 2014) as a source
of trusted information. They may also exploit a range of so-called ‘online reliability
indicators’ (Smart and Shadbolt, in press) to guide metacognitive processes relating
to information selection and endorsement (Arango-Mun˜oz, 2013). Interestingly, pro-
cesses that give rise to these indicators can, on occasion, be cast as a form of collective
or distributed cognition. Ben-Naim et al. (2013), for example, present a distributed
approach to the construction of (social) trust metrics, which are subsequently used
guide decisions relating to the endorsement of expert recommendations.
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puts into online information, the degree of transparency-in-use that is encoun-
tered, the ease with which the information can be interpreted, the amount of
personalization that has been undertaken, and the amount of cognitive trans-
formation introduced as a result of the bio-technological merger (Sterelny,
2010; Heersmink, 2015, in press; Menary, 2010; Sutton, 2006). The way we
interact with online information may vary along all of these dimensions; how-
ever, the higher an agent-Internet system ranks on these dimensions, the
denser the integration between the agent and the online information, and
the easier it becomes (we suggest) to regard the agent-Internet system as
engaging in a form of extended cognition. In this respect, it is interesting to
note that the general thrust of technology design seems to be largely in favor
of the emergence of cognitively-potent forms of bio-technological merger (see
Smart, in press). Of particular interest, are a range of technologies that target
our mnemonic capabilities (Clowes, 2015). We thus use our mobile devices
to store a lot of personalized information in the cloud and on the Internet,
including appointments, birthdays, shopping-lists, sketches, annotated docu-
ments, to-do lists, notes, reminders, bookmarked timetables, and so on. The
kinds of technologies that are used to interact with such online sources of
information (e.g., mobile, portable and wearable devices) arguably serve to
enhance the intensity of information flow between agent and the Internet, the
accessibility of information, the amount of trust a user puts into the informa-
tion, the degree of transparency-in-use, the ease with which the information
can be interpreted, and the amount of personalization. For these reasons, the
information is much more deeply integrated into the cognitive processes that
govern our behavior, and it is therefore easier to see it is part of an extended
cognitive system.
The way in which information is represented on the Internet may be of
particular relevance when it comes to understanding the profile of human-
Internet interactions. In particular, the transition to what has been referred
to as the Web of Data (see Section 2) may play an important role in enabling
Internet resources to be more closely integrated into everyday cognitive pro-
cessing routines. Smart (in press; 2012), for example, suggests that the tran-
sition from a Web of Documents to a Web of Data plays an important role in
enabling the Web to function as a component of bio-technologically hybrid
cognitive systems. One reason for this concerns the accessibility of specific
items of information—the fact that it is possible to retrieve isolated pieces of
information in a wide variety of different task contexts. Another reason relates
to the fact that content on the Web of Data becomes much more amenable
to machine-based processes that can find, filter and format data in ways that
are optimally suited to a human end-user’s specific information needs and
concerns (this is deemed to enhance the accessibility and functional poise of
online information). Finally, the move away from the Web of Documents to
the Web of Data opens up a range of presentational capabilities that can be
used to guide thought and action in particular ways. Thus, when we think
of the cognitive impact of new devices, such as Google’s Project Glass and
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its successors, we should not necessarily think of their presentational capa-
bilities as being limited to the display of conventional Web pages. Instead,
we should think of a whole variety of different data-driven presentational
capabilities, some assuming the form of simple natural language statements
and instructions, others relying on the use of graphical cues, prompts and
affordances. In addition, the notion of augmented, mixed or blended reality
enables us to think of Internet-based information being used to create virtual
overlays on the physical environment, enriching the kinds of environmental
structures to which our brain-based processing routines are already attuned
(see Section 3.1).
3.4 Collective Cognition
A recent focus of interest for the WAIS community relates to the use of Web
technologies to support socially-distributed forms of cognition (Chi, 2008,
2009; Kearns, 2012); i.e., forms of cognition in which the relevant cogni-
tive processes (e.g., reasoning, remembering and problem-solving) are dis-
tributed across a collection of individuals. This interest is reflected in a wealth
of research relating to online socio-technical systems. The conceptual land-
scape of the Social Web is thus littered with terms like social computing
(Parameswaran and Whinston, 2007), human computation (Law and von
Ahn, 2011; Michelucci, 2013), collective intelligence (Bonabeau, 2009; Mal-
one et al, 2010; Halpin, 2013), social machines (Hendler and Berners-Lee,
2010; Smart et al, 2014), technology-mediated social participation (Kraut
et al, 2010), and the global brain (Heylighen, 2013). The purpose of these
locutions is often to emphasize the way in which Web technologies can be
used to harness the socio-cognitive potential of large numbers of physically-
distributed individuals.
Because of the kinds of opportunities it affords for large-scale collabora-
tion, information sharing, and the coordination of collective efforts, the In-
ternet seems to be ideally suited to supporting cases of collective cognition.
Perhaps the best example of such support is provided by tasks that involve
some form of collaborative problem-solving or collective decision making (Chi,
2009; Chi et al, 2008). In this case, the Internet is often used to support
a form of ‘virtual team-working’17, in which a collection of geographically-
distributed individuals rely on the network-mediated exchange of information
as a means of coordinating their individual problem-solving efforts. Given the
popularity of such forms of virtual team-working in a range of organizational
settings (see Kanawattanachai and Yoo, 2002), it is perhaps not surprising
17 Virtual team-working is a form of team-working that relies on the use of infor-
mation and communications technology to support task-relevant forms of informa-
tion exchange, information processing and inter-agent coordination (see Powell et al,
2004).
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that this particular form of collective cognition has become a prominent fo-
cus of attention for those working in the disciplines of computer, cognitive
and network science. Recent research has thus sought to understand the fac-
tors that regulate the performance of collective cognitive systems under a
range of experimental conditions, with issues of network structure (i.e., the
time-variant organization of communication network topology) emerging as
a particularly important focus of empirical investigation (Kearns, 2012; Ma-
son, 2013; Mason and Watts, 2012; Mason et al, 2008; Smart et al, 2010a).
The kind of processing that is undertaken in the context of such systems is
sometimes glossed as a form of ‘socio-computational processing’, a term that
helps to highlight the important role that technologically-advanced compu-
tational systems play with respect to the mediation of social exchanges and
the active processing of task-relevant information18.
The notion of virtual teams19 thus serves as an important example of
how our existing notions of collective cognition—for example, work on group
(Theiner, 2014) and team cognition (Cooke et al, 2007; Salas et al, 2011)—
can be applied to the online world. Virtual teams do not, however, exhaust
the reach of the concept of collective cognition when it comes to understand-
ing various forms of Internet-mediated activity. In some cases, the processes
by which specific informational ecologies come into being on the Internet are
themselves also described in distributed or collective cognitive terms. Con-
sider, for example, the way in which the linking behavior of Internet users
yields a body of information that can be used to support the operation of
Internet search engines. The most popular example in this case, is, of course,
the PageRank algorithm, as used by Google Search. Here, the editing ac-
tions of countless numbers of Internet users serves as the analytic substrate
for machine-based processes that seek to enhance the accessibility of online
information in a way that is aligned with the interests and concerns of the
human user community. Heintz (2006) suggests that we should see such activ-
ities as a form of distributed (i.e., collective) cognition, one that (presumably)
supervenes on the actions of a very large number of human individuals. Such
claims are likely to prove controversial; however, Heintz’s (2006) analysis
does help to highlight the way in which a combination of human action and
machine-based processing can play an important role in creating and config-
18 Although it is easy to see such forms of processing as a relatively recent phe-
nomenon, it is important to remember that technologically low-grade variants of
socio-computational processing date back to at least the 18th century (see Grier,
2013).
19 A virtual team, in this case, is simply a collection of individuals that engages in
a form of virtual team-working (see Powell et al, 2004). Crucially, nothing in this
definition rules out the possibility that a virtual team could (at different points in
time) also function as a real-world (or face-to-face) team. The result is that any form
of (conventional) team cognition is also (potentially at least) a form of virtual team
cognition. Consider, for example, how collaborative sensemaking technologies (e.g.,
Shrager et al, 2010; Toniolo et al, 2014) might be used to support the kinds of analyses
undertaken by (e.g.) criminal investigators (Baber, 2013).
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uring the online environment. A similar point is made by Smart and Shad-
bolt (in press) in regard to the social construction of ‘reliability indicators’.
Smart and Shadbolt suggest that the individual actions of many thousands
of individuals helps to shape the kinds of cues and affordances that are avail-
able to guide the epistemic evaluation of online content. What is crucial here
is the sense in which the social and technological components of some larger
systemic organization are working to help shape and structure the nature of
the online cognitive ecology—an ecology that then plays a significant role in
sculpting the profile of our individual and collective cognitive endeavours.
Wikipedia is another example where one encounters this particular form of
cognitively-potent ‘ecological engineering’. In this case, the technical compo-
nents help to shape and scaffold user contributions in such a way as to yield
a rich and reliable source of information that is relevant to a broad range
of epistemic activities (Fallis, 2011). Wikipedia is, in fact, emblematic of a
broad range of systems, sometimes glossed as ‘social machines’ (Smart et al,
2014; Hendler and Berners-Lee, 2010), in which much of the online content is
supplied or generated by human end-users. Even if we demur from the con-
clusion that the processes associated with such systems should be regarded as
genuine cases of collective cognition, we can surely accept that such systems
support a form of ecological engineering that is relevant to our individual and
collective cognitive capabilities.
Inasmuch as systems like Google Search or Wikipedia count as cognitive
systems, they are clearly systems that exist at a much larger scale than the
kind of kind of cognitive systems that are the typical focus of distributed
cognition research. This, by itself, however, need not be a cause for concern.
As Hutchins (2014) himself suggests cognitive systems can exist at a vari-
ety of spatial and temporal scales. In the ecological context of the Internet,
we can identify a variety of socio-technical systems that could be considered
as potential candidates for cognitive scientific analysis. Such systems can be
ranked according to their relative social size, or the number of individual hu-
man agents that typically participate in them. At the lower end of this scale,
we encounter systems that can perhaps be broadly construed as virtual teams
(see above). The size of these systems typically ranges from tens to hundreds
of individuals. At larger scales, we encounter human computation systems20
(see Section 2) like Foldit (Khatib et al, 2011) and Galaxy Zoo (Lintott et al,
2008)21. These systems—and others like them (see Lintott and Reed, 2013)—
rely on the efforts of thousands of individuals in order to support the process
20 A human computation system, recall, is a system that combines human and ma-
chine capabilities to perform complex computational tasks (Law and von Ahn, 2011;
Michelucci, 2013; Quinn and Bederson, 2011,?).
21 In the case of Foldit, human pattern matching and spatial reasoning abilities
are used to help solve the problem of predicting the three-dimensional structure of
selected proteins (Khatib et al, 2011). Galaxy Zoo, in contrast, relies on human visual
pattern recognition to detect and classify galaxies from large-scale astronomical image
databases (Lintott et al, 2008).
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of scientific discovery. Systems such as Wikipedia and Google Search exist
at even larger scales. In the case of Wikipedia, for example, tens of thou-
sands of individuals participate in the editing of online articles, and Google
Search requires even larger numbers of individuals (hundreds of thousands
to millions). Large-scale forms of social participation are often critical to the
success of these systems: in the absence of large-scale social participation, for
example, Wikipedia could not have the coverage it does, nor could it update
its articles in a timely fashion. Both of these features are of obvious relevance
to Wikipedia’s status as a source of epistemically-significant information.
4 Conclusion
It is tempting to view the Internet as a globally-interconnected repository
of data and information. This view of the Internet is not necessarily incor-
rect; however, it does not really do justice to the many ways in which the
Internet shapes our actions and capabilities at both an individual and collec-
tive level. The Internet is thus not just an alternative way of disseminating
information in a manner akin to that accomplished by our traditional print
media (see Carr, 2010). Neither is the Internet merely “the next great exten-
sion of the ‘external symbolic storage system’ humans have developed since
the beginning of civilization” (Staley, 2014, p. ix). The Internet is, in fact,
many things. It is an instrument of social change, a mechanism for coordinat-
ing disaster relief efforts, a platform for scientific discovery, and a potential
breeding ground for the next generation of AI systems. It is also (perhaps
less positively) a tool for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on
corporate Websites, a marketplace for the exchange of illicit goods, a vector
for the transmission of extremist ideologies, and the future field of battle for
warring nation states. The Internet is, in essence, an environment in which
all manner of processes can occur and upon which many kinds of capabilities
are founded.
When our attention is directed to the realm of human cognitive activity,
we suggest the Internet plays an important role in shaping the nature of our
cognitive processes. The Internet, we claim, forms an important part of the
extra-organismic environment that shapes, scaffolds, supports, sustains and
perhaps even realizes our cognitive processing routines. It is, in essence, an
important part of the wider cognitive ecology in which our biological brains
are situated.
The value of a situated approach to cognition is that it helps us to ap-
preciate the many ways in which the Internet can impact our individual and
collective cognitive capabilities. Understanding the nature of this influence is
crucial. Even the most ardent advocate of neurocentrism would no doubt be
willing to accept that the kind of environment in which a biological brain is
situated says a great deal about the kinds of capabilities it can realize. A situ-
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ated approach to cognition can help to reveal the many ways in which the In-
ternet may influence our cognitive profiles, either for good or ill. It also helps
to focus our attention on the capabilities of cognitive organizations whose
systemic boundaries are not necessarily those of the (biologically-based) in-
dividual agent (e.g., extended and collective cognitive systems). Finally, a
situated approach helps to reveal the complex web of reciprocal influences
that exist between the Internet and those who use it. Importantly, the cogni-
tive ecology of the Internet is an environment of our own making. By virtue
of our interactions with the Internet, we help to shape what the Internet is,
what it can do, and what it may yet become. In this sense, we are all, as
Sterelny (2003) suggests, ‘ecological engineers’: we are all engaged in a pro-
cess of cognitive niche construction (see Clark, 2008), actively involved in the
construction and configuration of a bio-external nexus of material resources
that helps to influence the course of our cognitive processing and define the
limits of our cognitive capabilities.
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